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Title Promoting innovation in transition countries: A trajectory for smart specialisation 
 
Abstract 
Innovation policies seek to prepare an economy for the future by steering it on a transformation path to make it 
more competitive in increasingly global and interconnected markets. While most advanced economies have a 
tradition of strategymaking for territorially based innovation and economic development, transition countries 
moving from centralised unaccountable planning to decentralised democratic policymaking have no working, 
market-based practices to build on. Governments in such contexts often resort to mimicking the economic 
priorities and instruments of advanced countries. We suggest a trajectory for transition countries to avoid the 
widespread pitfall of poorly defined innovation policies by upgrading and changing their industrial polices in line 
with the ideas embedded in the concept of innovation strategies for smart specialisation (RIS3): (1) Build a 
trusted ‘competence centre’ to provide a comprehensive analysis of your economic fabric and coordinate the 
process; (2) Begin with one strong economic domain in which engaged stakeholders work together with 
government bodies to define joint priorities and actions (domain experimentation); (3) Start with one region to 
experiment with different approaches at subnational level (territorial experimentation); (4) Sequence your 
process in a way you can harvest the low-hanging fruits in the short-term (non-R & D measures), focus on the 
core of your activities with high potential in the medium term, and leave R & D-heavy breakthrough 
programmes for the longer term. 
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Executive summary 
Innovation policies seek to prepare an economy for the future by steering it on a 
transformation path to make it more competitive in increasingly global and 
interconnected markets. While most advanced economies have a tradition of 
strategymaking for territorially based innovation and economic development, transition 
countries moving from centralised unaccountable planning to decentralised democratic 
policymaking have no working, market-based practices to build on. Governments in such 
contexts often resort to mimicking the economic priorities and instruments of advanced 
countries. We suggest a trajectory for transition countries to avoid the widespread pitfall 
of poorly defined innovation policies by upgrading and changing their industrial polices in 
line with the ideas embedded in the concept of innovation strategies for smart 
specialisation (RIS3): (1) Build a trusted ‘competence centre’ to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of your economic fabric and coordinate the process; (2) Begin with one strong 
economic domain in which engaged stakeholders work together with government bodies 
to define joint priorities and actions (domain experimentation); (3) Start with a capable 
region to experiment different approaches at subnational level (territorial 
experimentation); (4) Sequence your process in a way you can harvest the low-hanging 
fruit in the short-term (non-R & D measures), focus on the core of your activities with 
high potential in the medium term, and leave R & D-heavy breakthrough programmes for 
the longer term. 
 
Policy context 
Smart specialisation is a European approach to foster knowledge-intensive development, 
a central element of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth. It requires national and regional administrations to identify, through a 
transparent ‘entrepreneurial process of discovery’, the innovative domains that have 
most potential for growth and to establish these as clear priorities for public investment. 
Since 2013, over 200 smart specialisation strategies have been developed, mostly at 
regional level, across the EU. The Smart Specialisation Platform was established at the 
Joint Research Centre, the European Commission’s in-house science and knowledge 
service, with the main objective of advising and supporting regional and national 
authorities tasked with coordinating the process. 
At the same time, the European Commission has identified regional development, 
competitiveness and smart specialisation as key areas for joint support activities in 
enlargement and neighbourhood countries. The regulation outlining pre-accession 
funding clearly mentions smart specialisation as a thematic priority for assistance to 
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enlargement countries (1). In a recent Joint Staff Working Document for the Eastern 
Partnership, the European Commission, together with the European External Action 
Service and the representatives of the six partner countries, agreed on having at least 
one partner government commit to starting a full-fledged RIS3 process in 2017 and 
formally adopting a new innovation strategy by 2020 (2). 
 
Main findings 
To be able to meaningfully start a comprehensive innovation strategy and stakeholder 
process, governments need to first understand where their economies stand and how 
they arrived at their current economic fabric. Every time this diagnosis is done, new 
discoveries can emerge about the evolution of economic sectors, their linkages, and 
subnational or regional variety. This exercise has also shown that economic potential 
does not only lie in high-tech manufacturing or established research and development 
(R & D); rather a broader definition is more appropriate, given the overall importance of 
services, and of combining new activities with existing traditional sectors to upgrade to 
higher value added. Smart specialisation is a strategy process to identify and prioritise 
new domains based on the current economic fabric with a strong involvement of 
stakeholder groups. 
Transition countries are driven to remodel and drastically reform their socioeconomic and 
political systems at the same time. Governments in such contexts often resort to 
mimicking the economic priorities and instruments of advanced countries. In turn, this 
alienates the policies from the economic reality on the ground, resulting in an increasing 
gap between wrongly defined policy agendas and their implementation. 
We see four major aspects to address: a better knowledge of the socioeconomic fabric is 
an important precondition for identifying key domains on which to focus effort (3). 
Identifying key domains and defining the policy instruments that can support them are 
the objectives of this strategic endeavour. This requires the design of an adequate 
governance structure, build-up of administrative capacities and the coordination with 
stakeholders. Progressive and iterative efforts are needed to accumulate experience and 
trigger policy learning. This is why we suggest four complementary options, which taken 
                                           
(1) European Parliament and Council of the EU, Regulation 231/2014 establishing an Instrument for Pre-
accession Assistance (IPA II) (2014). 
(2) European Commission and European External Action Service, Joint Staff Working Document, Eastern 
Partnership: Focusing on Key Priorities and Deliverables, SWD(2016) 467 final (2016). 
(3) Rodrik, D. and Hausmann, R., ‘Self-Discovery in a Development Strategy for El Salvador’, Economia 6, No 1 
(2005): 86. 
vi 
together build a trajectory for smart specialisation and economic transformation (4). 
Getting the process itself right is at least as important as the final outcome of the 
strategy process: 
Option 1: Build a ‘competence centre’ to manage the process of learning and 
strategymaking. This team, freed from political considerations to the extent possible, 
prepares the full evidence needed for an innovation strategy and its implementation. 
Professionals from diaspora networks can contribute to this centre. Political support, 
important to start and manage the process, is obtained through inter-ministerial working 
groups and high-level R & I councils. 
Option 2: Begin with a pilot on a well-developed economic domain with willing and 
capable stakeholders to experiment with different approaches for defining the fine-
grained sub-areas of prioritised domains and designing ways to mobilise the right 
stakeholders (domain experimentation). Showing the effects smart specialisation had in 
the EU can trigger greater interest among stakeholders, who are often eager to engage 
provided governments provide credible incentives. 
Option 3: Take the ‘experimental approach’ from smart specialisation and apply it in one 
capable and interested region that would help set the approach for other ones, enabling a 
cumulative process over time to overcome the lack of data about the situation on the 
ground (territorial experimentation). Regional administrations enjoy sometimes greater 
trust from stakeholders than national ones. 
Option 4: Take existing activities as a starting point and develop a 3-phase process that 
sequences and prioritises measures. Start with small-scale activities and projects, while 
following the broader principles of smart specialisation. Experimental approaches, by 
definition, can fail. Given the limited public resources in most transition countries, ‘low-
hanging fruit’ are a viable way to start. Sunset clauses are useful mechanisms to assess 
progress of experimental new measures and projects, while limiting costs of failure. 
 
Related and future JRC work 
Since 1999, JRC has been providing scientific and technical support to countries on the 
road towards EU membership, new Member States and countries associated to the EU 
Framework Programme for Research and Innovation. Smart specialisation has become a 
key element of these activities, supporting bottom-up processes focused on regional 
development and economic transformation. Until 2018, JRC is conducting a pilot project 
to build capacities for participatory and evidence-based processes in Serbia, Moldova and 
                                           
(4) Foray, D., Smart Specialisation: Opportunities and Challenges for Regional Innovation Policy (Abingdon; 
New York: Routledge, 2015), 86. 
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Ukraine. Insights from this pilot can provide critical input for designing and implementing 
innovation policies for smart specialisation in emerging economies and less developed 
countries more generally. 
 
Quick guide 
The report begins by outlining the relationship between industrial and innovation policy: 
both share the goal of transforming the economic structure but differ regarding the 
means to achieve this. In a second step, the lessons learnt from two decades of regional 
innovation initiatives in Europe underscore the importance of initial phases. Success is 
highly contingent on a precise idea of a region’s endowments and on appropriate 
solutions to tackle properly identified issues. Thirdly, we present the main novelties 
smart specialisation entails. Finding new opportunities and prioritising new domains 
constitutes a discovery process that requires a strong involvement of multiple 
stakeholders. It is an interactive process as opposed to traditional planning processes. 
Fourthly, we discuss the implications for transition economies. Structural change in these 
countries has meant drastic changes of the economic fabric’s composition through harsh 
de-industrialisation, the emergence of a large services sector and associated shifts in 
employment. All this had repercussions on sectoral productivity, trade and specialisation 
patterns and the attempts to link to global value chains. The report concludes with four 
options for a trajectory for smart specialisation. A competence centre to manage the 
process and ensure a methodologically sound process is a key component of this 
trajectory.
1 
1 Industrial and innovation policies: Same goals, different 
means 
Innovation policies, similar to industrial plans in the past, seek to prepare an economy 
for the future by steering it on a transformation path to make it more competitive in 
increasingly global and interconnected markets. To be able to meaningfully start a 
comprehensive strategy and stakeholder process for this, governments need to first 
understand where their economies stand and how they arrived at their current economic 
fabric. Every time this diagnosis is done, new discoveries can emerge about the evolution 
of economic sectors, their linkages, and subnational or regional variety. This exercise has 
also shown that economic potential does not only lie in high-tech manufacturing or 
established research and development (R & D); rather a broader definition is more 
appropriate, given the overall importance of services, and of combining new activities 
with existing traditional sectors to upgrade to higher value added. Smart specialisation is 
a strategy process to identify and prioritise new domains based on the current economic 
fabric with a strong involvement of stakeholder groups. 
Academic authors as well as policymakers have used different terminologies to speak of 
the same objective: making national industries more competitive so that they create 
employment, wealth and well-being. This was already the objective of post-WWII 
classical industrial policies that addressed economic sectors. One approach was to build 
‘technical centres’ for the manufacturing firms to enhance their capability to project 
themselves into the future — what we now label foresight and roadmapping — and to 
improve the ability of firms to absorb new technologies. This holds true especially for new 
production technologies, e.g. new materials or electronic components. Progressively 
preparing new products and processes became an activity in itself, encapsulated in the 
terms of R & D and later innovation. OECD was instrumental in this move both in pushing 
for specific policies but also for measuring investments made by countries — with the 
famous Frascati and later Oslo manuals. OECD documents are also a good mirror of three 
evolutions: we moved from ‘politique scientifique et technique’ to ‘science and technology 
policy’, then to ‘science, technology and innovation policy’, which was synthesised in the 
2000s in the idea of ‘innovation policy’ or in recent policy documents phrased as 
‘research and innovation policy’ (R & I). 
Similarly, the portfolio of instruments that could be mobilised enlarged. The Compendium 
for Innovation Policy mirrors this expansion (5). Direct support to individual firm projects 
has always been an important component of public policies. Today this is often delegated 
to a professional agency or development bank. Many governments complement direct 
                                           
(5) http://www.innovation-policy.org.uk/compendium (accessed 2 April 2017).   
2 
support with fiscal policies such as research tax credits so that firms take their own risks. 
As evidence showed that technology absorption by firms was difficult without those firms 
participating in its creation, collaborative programmes became another important tool, 
especially for large firms. Centres de ressources technologiques were created to 
intermediate between knowledge producers and small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). The former were more mobilised by national governments and the EU, whereas 
the latter were mostly developed at regional level. Since the beginning of R & I policies, 
an important aspect has been the promise of new industries borne by breakthrough and 
frontier science. The large programmes in the 1960s and 1970s organised public efforts 
to create new industries in nuclear energy, civil aeronautics and space. Many scholars 
analysing these programmes in OECD countries considered that this was no longer an 
adequate policy and that policies should support the creation of ‘new technology-based’ 
or ‘start-up’ firms, also called spin-out firms when coming from university. This became 
widely adopted and supported by a rich portfolio of instruments, ranging from incubators, 
science parks and technopoles to supporting the risk capital industry. The shift started at 
the beginning of the 1980s and became prevalent in the 1990s. Academic work has 
shown that only in exceptional cases do such firms become new large enterprises like 
Apple or Microsoft. They mostly remain small to medium sized or provide new market 
opportunities for large existing firms that buy them. 
The 2000s have witnessed three major evolutions in our understanding of innovation and 
in corresponding policies that today build the core of R & I policies: 
 
1. The rediscovery of the importance of framework conditions that help in building a 
friendly environment for innovation. This covers four main dimensions. The oldest 
of policy interventions is intellectual property rights originating in the 18th 
century. Standards build a second critical dimension not only for safety issues but 
also as a major tool to shape and harmonise markets. Third, recent work has 
highlighted the increasing importance of procurement policies: in 2007, public 
procurement was estimated at 16 % of the combined EU GDP, a figure that 
demonstrates the catalytic role it can play in the development of new products (6). 
As procurement is widely distributed, R & I policy becomes thus de facto a multi-
level policy whose principles are decided at the national level, while its 
implementation depends mostly on regional and local authorities. Some analysts 
consider human capital a fourth critical framework condition, highlighting the 
contribution of education and training policies to innovation.  
                                           
(6) Edler J. and Georghiou, L., ‘Public Procurement and Innovation: Resurrecting the Demand Side’, Research 
Policy, No 36 (2007), 949-963. 
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2. In the 1990s and early 2000s, governments rather retracted from sectoral 
policies. In the predominant view of that time, focusing on sectors or ‘sectoral 
innovation systems’ was considered very difficult to implement given that most 
economic sectors reach beyond administrative borders, value chains are becoming 
increasingly international if not global, and innovation is becoming increasingly 
‘open’, mobilising actors from multiple countries, domains and organisations. 
Recent debates on the ‘entrepreneurial state’ indicate a return to sector-based 
policy development — albeit in different shape. Sectoral policies now are linked to 
collective initiatives of various actors — such as those associated at European 
level to technology platforms; and they tend to be more narrowly targeted toward 
transforming sectors. Modern sectoral policies no longer focus mainly on 
manufacturing industries. They also include knowledge-intensive business services 
as well as culture — from museums to games, tourism or services more broadly 
speaking. 
3. The third major evolution is largely associated with decentralisation and the 
recognition of the central role of small and mid-sized firms in job creation in OECD 
countries. Multiple academic analyses have highlighted the critical importance of 
proximity and clusters as central levers for competitiveness. This has 
progressively transformed regions and metropolitan areas into central actors for 
supporting innovation capabilities. 
 
While framework conditions provide the necessary basis for economic growth and are by 
and large determined at the national or even global level, we focus on the sectoral and 
territorial dimensions. They underscore the need for strategic capabilities to define and 
coordinate transformational activities by governments, firms, organised interest and 
research organisations. In the next section we discuss the lessons learnt from more than 
two decades of policy evolution in regional development and territorial innovation 
policies. 
 
4 
2 Lessons learnt from regional development and innovation 
strategies 
Since the 1980s, innovation processes have been increasingly conceived as a complex, 
collective endeavour where a set of actors such as firms, other organisations and 
institutions interact in the generation, diffusion and use of new—and economically 
valuable—knowledge in the production process. This implies a vision of innovation as a 
multi-faceted behaviour that is not limited to the development or adoption of new 
technologies. The complexity of these processes has first been captured in the discourse 
on national innovation systems. This approach revealed huge differences between 
countries in terms of economic structure, R & D capabilities, institutional set-up and 
innovation performance. It also generated a growing interest in intra-country diversity, 
and the regional innovation systems framework puts the territorial dimension into the 
limelight. Four reasons support this view: 
  
1. Every region is different with respect to industrial specialisation patterns and 
innovation performance. 
2. Knowledge spillovers play a key role in the innovation process and are often 
concentrated locally. 
3. Tacit knowledge contributes to developing new domains (7). Yet it is difficult to 
unveil knowledge that is often fragmented across individuals and organisations. 
To be useful, it requires intensive personal contacts and trust to enable exchange 
and mutual learning, which are facilitated by proximity. 
4. In many countries, powers to design or implement R & I policies are devolved to 
regions and cities (8). The EU is emblematic of this, given its complex multilevel 
governance and the way the European Commission shares management 
responsibilities with national and regional authorities for regional development 
funds. 
 
Building on insights from clusters and industrial districts, EU regions and Member States 
have been elaborating territorial innovation strategies, their goals and means in an 
evolutionary process over the last two decades. In the funding period 1994-1999, the 
European Commission implemented innovation support as the first large-scale initiative 
                                           
(7) Specialised regions with strong interest organisations in a specific industry that are accumulating tacit 
knowledge may face negative lock-ins and even system failures if the factors of success become constraints. 
(8) Tödtling, F. and Trippl. M., ‘One Size Fits All? Towards a Differentiated Regional Innovation Policy Approach’, 
Research Policy 34, No 8 (2005): 1203-19. 
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in this direction within the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), thus laying the 
foundation for what we understand today as regional innovation strategies (RIS) (9). 
Regional Programmes of Innovative Actions were developed in the period 2000-2006. In 
parallel, pre-accession countries in Eastern Europe benefitted from similar support to 
develop RIS. In total, more than 120 regions participated in these strategy exercises. 
These projects aimed at fostering an economic and institutional environment that 
promotes the creation, dissemination and adoption of knowledge, which in turn was 
meant to increase the competitiveness and the attractiveness of regional economies. RIS 
focused their attention on a wider set of inter-relationships among innovation actors. 
They paid particular attention to the way in which universities, educational and R & D 
institutions, technology centres, the public sector at different administrative levels and 
firms interact with each other in an interdependent economic ecology. The role of SMEs is 
particularly important in this process, as they create the vast majority of employment 
and, at the same time, often do not have access to newly generated knowledge. 
Therefore, improving the connectivity of SMEs within the RIS should contribute to 
increased competitiveness. 
Since the establishment of the first generation of RIS as a policy field in the 1990s, 
constant learning and feedback exercises have taken place. Looking back we can find a 
wealth of different experiences of national and regional innovation strategies in the 
framework of the EU cohesion policy: strategy development exercises (RIS, RITTS, RISI), 
inter-regional best practice demonstrations (RTT, RISI2) and pilot actions (RIS+, 
RISI+) (10). These initiatives brought greater levels of cooperation and transparency, 
strengthened expertise available in regions, provided better communication between 
technology providers and clients (including policymakers), increased funding of 
innovation-focused activities and geared public investments towards the long term. 
These policies thus supported a gradual build-up of innovation capacity. In a knowledge-
intensive society, this capacity is primarily evidenced by access to three key components: 
existence of qualified human capital, access to competence and know-how, and 
availability of financial resources. 
At the same time, these initiatives had several drawbacks. Regional innovation systems 
were often considered in isolation, lacking a truly international or trans-regional 
perspective. They were not well aligned with the industrial and economic context of 
regions. Public involvement in R & D by far exceeded that from the private sector. A 
narrow and linear vision of innovation prevailed excessively stressing research and its 
                                           
(9) Charles, D. R., Nauwelaers, C., Mouton, B. and Bradley, D., Assessment of the Regional Innovation and 
Technology Transfer Strategies and Infrastructures (RITTS) Scheme, Final Evaluation Report (2000). 
(10) European Commission, Innovative Strategies and Actions: Results from 15 Years of Regional 
Experimentation (Brussels: Directorate-General Regional Policy, 2007).  
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path towards commercialisation. There was a ‘picking winners’ syndrome. The best 
performing regions and countries were often copied without consideration of the local 
context. In many cases, external consultants were driving these processes, leaving little 
ownership to regional stakeholders. Most of the initiatives had an excessive focus on the 
technological supply and R & D. 
One of the main lessons from these past initiatives lies in the importance of initial 
phases. Evaluations have shown that the identification of relevant societal needs and 
capabilities at the outset is of utmost importance. They also underscore the significance 
of implementation paths defining feasible processes to address societal needs and 
capabilities, as well as mobilising resources accordingly. In other words, the success of 
RIS was highly contingent on a precise idea of a region’s endowments and on appropriate 
solutions to tackle identified issues. Evaluations finally showed that this requires 
continuity and represents an iterative process over a long time period (11). This iterative 
process is all the more important, since significant changes in or outside the region 
happen rapidly and may require a re-evaluation of the identified preconditions. Periodic 
revisions highly depend upon keeping stakeholders in productive interactions, allowing 
each of them to progressively and voluntarily adapt their behaviour in terms of agendas, 
objectives and actions. Facilitating this process often requires changes in the vertical and 
horizontal governance systems. The culture of hierarchical policymaking does not only 
face problems in dealing with the need to accept a division of labour between 
organisations; it also struggles to ensure a certain level of competition and redundancy 
to meet the challenges of rapidly changing scenarios. 
 
                                           
(11) Socintec and Inno, Ex-post Evaluation of the RIS, RTTs and RISI ERDF Innovative Actions for the Period 
1994-1999, Final Synthesis Report to the European Commission (2005). 
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3 Smart specialisation as a new approach 
The Knowledge for Growth expert group wove these lessons from regional development 
with academic insights on innovation economics and synthesised them in the concept of 
smart specialisation (12). It builds a clear transformational approach for policy 
intervention by emphasising a vertical and non-neutral logic of intervention. Given that 
governments simply cannot pay attention to all existing economic sectors, it aims at 
helping regional economies to discover new domains with a strong potential for growth. 
The word domain here is used on purpose to differentiate it from a whole sector or 
technology. One example cited by the authors is taken from Finland, where companies 
explored the potential of nanotechnology to improve the operational efficiency of the pulp 
and paper industry. New domains often lie at the juncture of different sectors. 
Finding new opportunities and exploring new domains constitutes a discovery process 
that requires a strong involvement of multiple actors. It is an interactive process as 
opposed to traditional planning processes. In a nutshell, this is not a one-off solution but 
an iterative process that should take place periodically, being based on an assessment of 
the regional situation and on the results of previous processes. It involves experiments 
aimed at fostering a structural evolution of the whole regional economy. Smart 
specialisation has become the official approach of the European Commission to support 
the innovative capabilities of regions within the cohesion policy. 
We do not intend here to review the accumulated practice; rather we underline four 
characteristics that are crucial to the observed dynamics: 
 
1. The starting point is to build a solid understanding of the economic fabric of a 
country and its regions, in order to identify the nature of the sectors present. This 
requires a good understanding of inter-sectorial linkages and the entire production 
cycle to identify opportunities for growth. A territory’s capabilities are usually 
locally concentrated, be it in industrial districts, clusters or innovation networks. 
An analytical and geographic mapping of the economic, research and innovation 
potential establishes the informational basis to prioritise domains; see Figure 1 for 
an illustration. 
 
  
                                           
(12) Foray, D., Smart Specialisation and the New Industrial Policy Agenda, Knowledge Economists Policy Brief 
No 8 (Brussels, 2008); Foray, D., David, P. A. and Hall, B., Smart Specialisation: The Concept, Knowledge 
Economists Policy Brief No 9 (Brussels, 2009). 
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Figure 1: Mapping territorial and sectoral diversity in sub-regions 
 
Source: Mapping location quotients of gross value added in the Polish region Wielkopolska. 
Developed by Monika Matusiak and Wojciech Kisiała Centre for Public Policy, Poznan University of 
Economics and Business. 
 
2. This informational basis critically supports strategy definition. Experience 
accumulated in the past underlines the importance of mobilising and coordinating 
the capabilities of R & I organisations and firms to collectively discuss and choose 
the domains with the highest transformation potential. This involves both top-
down coordination — often within established sectors — and bottom-up initiatives 
driven by territorial stakeholders articulating their expectations. The more firms 
and research organisations are engaged in prioritising domains, the more likely 
the chosen economic transformation path will reflect a solid consensus with widely 
shared goals. In a highly competitive environment, effective prioritisation bringing 
together established and new domains can ensure the future of existing 
industries. Reaching this analytical and societal agreement helps to avoid what 
has happened in the past, namely the mere imitation of good practices from 
elsewhere. It is worth repeating that vertical prioritisation focuses on detailed 
activity areas, not sectors or single projects. Focus groups and project 
development labs, for instance, are formats to organise such processes (13). 
 
                                           
(13) http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/entrepreneurial-discovery-process-cycle (accessed 24 April 2017). 
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3. These dynamics require a clear governance structure to be performative. Knowing 
who does what is crucial both for an effective internal coordination within and 
between administrations, but also for ensuring that the outside world is aware of 
what is happening and whom to contact to get involved. In quite a number of 
cases, regions have delegated this process to a competence centre — which can 
even be shared between regions or established at the national level to ensure 
both critical mass and learning. The strength of such policies relies on their formal 
adoption at the highest possible political level, in many cases through 
parliamentary assemblies. Doing so validates the analysis made, the domains 
selected and their agreed objectives. Thus it provides a strategic agenda that 
serves as an orientation for where the territory is heading to all domestic R & I 
actors and the outside world. Given the partly experimental nature of RIS3, these 
documents must be living documents that have to be revised in regular intervals. 
 
4. Such documents very seldom devise roadmaps for transformation and 
implementation paths. Choosing appropriate instruments to successfully meet the 
defined goals for chosen domains is no trivial task. Strong bias exists towards 
using established default instruments like R & D grants to individual projects or 
firms. In some cases this may be justified. Yet, priority domains will materialise 
through broader policy portfolios, often requiring a mix of instruments. Figure 2 
provides a taxonomy of innovation policy instruments, knowing that most of the 
time we face ‘policy mixes’, that is a set of instruments that are combined in time 
and space. One important aspect highlighted by this figure is the dual balance 
between horizontal and vertical instruments and even more so between supply 
and demand-side instruments. Demand-side instruments are said to have high yet 
untapped potential and public procurement is an often-cited example. The 
articulation of the choices made is an important dimension that enables 
stakeholders to grasp the strategy’s logic of intervention. It also enables better 
monitoring and assessment of dynamics and the potential for materialisation of 
the proposed transformations. 
 
 
10 
Figure 2: Taxonomy of innovation policy instruments 
 
Source: Edler, J., Cunningham, P., Gök, A. and Shapira, P., Impacts of Innovation Policy: Synthesis 
and Conclusion, Nesta Working Paper 13/21 (2013): 7. 
 
Smart specialisation approaches combine two dimensions: (i) the need for long-term 
engagement by governments in structural economic transformation through innovation, 
(ii) taking place through an iterative process that enables periodic adaptation — and even 
redefinition. When certain activity areas receive privileged and targeted government 
support, clear success criteria must be defined as to allow policymakers to assess their 
performance after the support ends. It is not because we speak of innovation that public 
engagement should focus on frontier science and breakthrough innovations. Most of the 
time, the starting point is existing activities with the goal to make them more 
competitive. 
The implementation of smart specialisation is challenging because it integrates different 
policy areas and responsibilities, across ministries, and from local and regional to national 
and European levels. Moreover, it requires different innovation actors to work closely 
together, including firms, knowledge centres, government and civil society itself — the 
end-users of innovation and on occasion co-producers of knowledge. Two key aspects 
have been identified as important success factors: an institutional eco-system that 
supports innovation, and the ability and capacities of public sector institutions for 
effective strategic management and organisational development. 
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4 Implications for transition economies 
R & I policies in transition economies face additional challenges compared to advanced 
market economies. By definition, governments in transition countries must organise and 
sequence a vast number of necessary and difficult socioeconomic reforms, leading to a 
‘dilemma of simultaneity’ (14). Structural change in these countries has meant drastic 
changes of the economic fabric’s composition through harsh de-industrialisation, the 
emergence of a large services sector and associated shifts in employment (15). All this 
had repercussions on sectoral productivity, trade and specialisation patterns and the 
attempts to link to global value chains. Government behaviour also had to change 
radically, requiring a completely new relationship between the state and the economy. 
This governance challenge has often materialised in weak coordination capabilities, low 
stakeholder trust in governments, little experience with instruments to support 
innovation and limited professionalisation of R & I managers. 
What we observe in transition economies resembles the 1960s, when building ‘social 
capabilities’ — managerial skills, stable and effective government, mobilisation of capital 
through financial institutions and the creation of trust in society — was seen as vital to 
achieve the technological catch-up in the developing world (16). This required introducing 
new institutional arrangements like development banks. Recent evidence suggests that 
such capabilities are more difficult to build than expected. Similar challenges were 
highlighted for European regions in what regional development professionals call ‘regional 
innovation paradox’ (17). Poor regions and countries are those with the strongest need for 
innovation, yet they have at the same time relatively weak capabilities and institutions to 
pursue successful innovation policies. In the EU cohesion policy, this paradox is 
compounded by the preferential allocation of substantial funding to less developed 
regions, that must plan and co-finance projects notwithstanding their capacity 
constraints. Having large amounts of funding does not automatically translate into their 
strategic and effective use. 
The aforementioned challenges are only partly compensated by two important 
advantages. Many east European transition economies can resort to a well-educated 
workforce with strong capabilities in ‘science, technology, engineering and mathematics’ 
                                           
(14) Offe, C., ‘Das Dilemma Der Gleichzeitigkeit. Demokratisierung und Marktwirtschaft in Osteuropa’, Merkur 
45. No 4 (1991): 279-92. 
(15) Berglof, E., Foray, D., Landesmann, M., Yifu Lin, J., Nauro Campos, M., Sanfey, P., Radosevic, S. and 
Volchkova, N., ‘Transition Economics Meets New Structural Economics’, Journal of Economic Policy Reform 18, 
No 3 (2015): 191-220. 
(16) Fagerberg, J. and Srholec, M., ‘National Innovation Systems, Capabilities and Economic Development’, 
Research Policy 37, No 9 (2008): 1417-35. 
(17) Oughton, C., Landabaso, M. and Morgan, K., ‘The Regional Innovation Paradox: Innovation Policy and 
Industrial Policy’, The Journal of Technology Transfer 27, No 1 (2002): 97-110. 
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like in Serbia and Ukraine, both through classical research organisations and increasingly 
through universities. Another positive element is the rather rich and diverse firm 
environment (18). Given the lack of appropriate data, we do not know enough about the 
actual situation of this complex and unbalanced economic composition. To reap the 
benefits from these advantages, a proper mapping of the economic fabric, which has 
undergone far-reaching changes over the 25 years, is thus required. The mapping results 
can be used to highlight the added value of innovation different domains. 
 
                                           
(18) Firm and economic diversity can be measured in different ways. One broad approach is based on traded 
goods. The MIT Atlas of Economic complexity calculates scores on how diversified and complex a country’s 
export basket is. In its 2014 and 2015 rankings, 17 out of the 50 most complex economies are post-socialist 
transition economies; see http://atlas.media.mit.edu (accessed 12 May 2017). Another indicator is the share of 
manufacturing firms doing in-house R & D. In 2014, 19 out of the top 50 countries have been post-socialist 
transition economies; see http://data.uis.unesco.org (accessed 12 May 2017). 
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5 Trajectory for smart specialisation in transition economies 
From the preceding analysis, we see four major aspects to address: a better knowledge 
of the socioeconomic fabric is an important precondition for identifying key domains on 
which to focus effort (19). Identifying key domains and defining the policy instruments 
that can support them are the objectives of this strategic endeavour. This requires the 
design of an adequate governance structure, build-up of administrative capacities and 
the coordination with stakeholders. Progressive and iterative efforts are needed to 
accumulate experience and trigger policy learning. This is why we suggest four 
complementary options, which taken together build a trajectory for economic 
transformation (20). Getting the process itself right is at least as important as the final 
outcome of the strategy process. 
 
Option 1: Build a ‘competence centre’ to manage the process of learning and 
strategymaking. This team, freed from political considerations to the extent possible, 
prepares the full evidence needed for an innovation strategy and its implementation (21). 
Professionals from diaspora networks can contribute to this centre. Political support, 
important to start and manage the process, is obtained through inter-ministerial working 
groups and high-level R & I councils. 
 
Option 2: Begin with a pilot on a well-developed economic domain with willing and 
capable stakeholders to experiment with different approaches for defining the fine-
grained sub-areas of prioritised domains and designing ways to mobilise the right 
stakeholders (domain experimentation). Showing the effects smart specialisation had in 
the EU can trigger greater interest among stakeholders who are often eager to engage, 
provided governments provide credible incentives. 
 
Option 3: Take the ‘experimental approach’ from smart specialisation and apply it in one 
capable and willing region. This would help apply the approach to other regions, enabling 
a cumulative process over time to overcome the lack of data about the situation on the 
                                           
(19) Rodrik, D. and Hausmann, R., ‘Self-Discovery in a Development Strategy for El Salvador’, Economia 6, No 1 
(2005): 86. 
(20) Foray, D., Smart Specialisation: Opportunities and Challenges for Regional Innovation Policy (Abingdon; 
New York: Routledge, 2015), 86. 
(21) Approaches for mature industries and those addressing radically new domains may require different types 
of competence centre. On this issue and possible trade-offs between experimentation and implementation see 
Breznitz, D. and Ornston, D., ‘The Revolutionary Power of Peripheral Agencies: Explaining Radical Policy 
Innovation in Finland and Israel’, Comparative Political Studies 46, No 10 (2013): 1219. 
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ground (territorial experimentation). Regional administrations enjoy sometimes greater 
trust from stakeholders than national ones. 
 
Option 4: Take existing activities as a starting point and develop a 3-phase process that 
sequences and prioritises measures (see Figure 3). Start with small-scale activities and 
projects, while following the broader principles of smart specialisation. Experimental 
approaches, by definition, can fail. Given the limited public resources in most transition 
countries, ‘low-hanging fruit’ are a viable way to start. Sunset clauses are useful 
mechanisms to assess progress of experimental new measures and projects, while 
limiting costs of failure. 
 
 
Figure 3: Taking a 3-step approach 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Short-term 
cumulative 
changes, e.g. new 
business models 
2. Core activities 
with high potential 
requiring mid-term 
deployment 
3. Long-term 
breakthrough 
opportunities, 
mostly driven by 
public research 
Figure 3: A step-wise approach 
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